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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of net neutrality on media
diversity. We show that in the net neutrality regime, media rms al-
ways provide media diversity, whereas in the no net neutrality regime,
the equilibrium of the model depends on the relation between net-
work capacity and network tra¢ c. If the network capacity is large
relatively to network tra¢ c, the equilibrium of the no net neutrality
regime is similar to the one under the net neutrality regime. However,
if network capacity is small relative to network tra¢ c, under the no
net neutrality regime media rms do not provide media diversity. The
reason is that when network capacity is small relative to network traf-
c, the no net neutrality regime hinders competition. In other words,
with no net neutrality, the media rm with priority sees its hinter-
land more protected from its rival than under net neutrality, and the
contrary for the rm with no priority. As a result, while the media
rm with priority has less need to provide media diversity to attract
demand and as such advertising revenues, the media rm with no pri-
ority nds it more di¢ cult to use media diversity to attract demand
and advertising revenues.
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Net Neutrality.
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1 Introduction
One of the most debated topics concerning the Internet is net neutrality.
With net neutrality, all content provided by Content Providers (CPs) has in
theory the same priority. This means that consumers have the same speed
of access to any content available in the Internet. Under no net neutrality,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can give priority to some CPs in exchange of
a payment. This in practice means that consumers can access contents from
CPs with network priority faster than contents from CPs with no priority.
In other words, with net neutrality, ISPs should treat all tra¢ c equally, the
so-called non-discrimination rule, while with no net neutrality they can give
tra¢ c priority to some CPs1. In this sense, one of the issues that the net
neutrality debate has raised concerns the diversity of content that is provided
in the Internet. Some defend that net neutrality promotes the provision of
more diversied content, since all content has equal treatment and therefore
all CPs have equal chances to win consumers. Others defend that no net
neutrality is the only way to promote investment in content by the most
innovative CPs, since CPs can have higher returns on investment. For a
discussion of these issues, see Schuett (2014). In this paper, we analyze this
question of the e¤ects of net neutrality regime on the diversity of contents
provided by CPs in the Internet.
Media diversity is said to be important, because is believed to promote in-
novation and competition2. The literature on media diversity however shows
that media diversity in media markets cannot be taken for granted. In fact,
media diversity may be a¤ected by a series of factors such as the concen-
tration of the media industry (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996; and George, 2007
and Roger, 2009); advertising (Gabszewicz et al., 2001, 2002; Argentesi and
Filistrucchi, 2007; Ellman and Germano, 2009; A¤eldt et al., 2013; and Gar-
cia Pires, 2013); the diversity of readerspolitical preferences (Garcia Pires,
2013); market structure (Steiner, 1952; George and Waldfogel, 2003; and
George and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011); subsidies (Lerocha and Wellbrock, 2011);
1Net neutrality also implies a zero-price rule, in the sense that ISPs should not collect
fees from CPs. Here, we focus more on the non-discrimination rule.
2Another benet of media diversity, particularly relevant for instance in the news mar-
ket, is that media diversity can be central to the democratic process. Accordingly, if media
diversity is low, in the sense that few political actors control which news and political opin-
ions are broadcasted, this can a¤ect political choices, political freedom and in the end also
economic freedom and property rights.
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party political competition (Noam, 1987; and Schulz and Weimann, 1989);
and technology (Gentzkow, 2007; and George and Hogendorn, 2012).
To the best of our knowledge, the net neutrality literature has not yet
looked at the e¤ects of the net neutrality regime on media diversity. For
a review of the economic literature on net neutrality, see Schuett (2014).
For instance, Choi and Kim (2010) analyze the e¤ects of net neutrality on
the investment incentives of ISPs. They nd that no net neutrality can
have negative e¤ects on the investment incentives of ISP. Economides and
Hermalin (2012), in turn, argue that since the no net neutrality regime allows
ISPs to price discriminate among CPs, investment in bandwidth can increase.
The social welfare e¤ects are ambiguous, though, due to the ine¢ ciencies that
arises with price discrimination.
Lee and Wu (2009) defend that net neutrality facilitates the entry of CPs.
In addition, they argue that net neutrality avoids the problem of Internet
fragmentation, since CPs can access all consumers and consumers can access
all CPs. Kraemer and Wiewiorra (2012) argue that the most e¢ cient regime
is the one that provides higher incentives to infrastructure investment by
the ISPs. They argue that the no net neutrality regime can better allocate
network capacity in both the short and the long run, since it increases demand
for priority by new CPs that enter the market. Cheng et al. (2008), on
the other hand, argue that the gains of the no net neutrality regime are
distributed asymmetrically between ISPs and CPs, ISPs have the most to
gain and CPs the most to lose. They further argue that under net neutrality,
ISPs invest in capacity at the social optimum level, while they over- or under-
invest in relation to the social optimum with the no net neutrality regime.
Hermalin and Katz (2007) instead look at quality incentives for CPs un-
der the two regimes. They show that the no net neutrality regime negatively
a¤ects quality provision and that as a result welfare might be reduced. This
is so since, while low quality providers exit the market, and medium quality
providers upgrade quality, the high quality providers reduce quality invest-
ments. Musacchio et al. (2009), in turn, argue that the choice between the
two regimes depends on the relation between advertising rates and end-user
price sensitivity. In particular, the no net neutrality regime is preferable
when this relation is either low or high. Reggiani and Valletti (2014) on the
other hand, defend that the two regimes have asymmetric impacts on large
and small CPs. In the short run, the regime with no net neutrality leads to
increased content provision by small CPs, but to reduced content provision
by large CPs. In the long run, ISPs reduce network capacity, but small CPs
3
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increase content at the expenses of large CPs. Finally, Bourreau et al. (2012)
analyze the case with more than one ISPs and with several CPs. Under this
scenario, they nd that the no net neutrality regime is preferable, although
CPs can lose.
In this paper, we analyze the incentives of CPs to provide media diversity.
Our focus is not ISPs since, as we have just seen, this has received most of
the attention of the literature on net neutrality. We show that under the net
neutrality regime, CPs always follow a strategy to diversify content. Under
the no net neutrality regime, the decision to diversify content will depend on
the relation between network capacity and network tra¢ c. When network
capacity is small relative to network tra¢ c, CPs maximally di¤erentiate their
content, but do not provide media diversity. When network capacity is large
relative to network tra¢ c, CPs minimally di¤erentiate their content, but
they do provide media diversity. The reason why CPs do not provide media
plurality when network capacity is small relatively to network tra¢ c, is that
the no net neutrality regime reduces competition. In particular, under the
no net neutrality regime, the media rm with priority sees its hinterland
more protected from the rival than under the net neutrality regime, and the
reverse for the rm with no priority. As a result, on the one hand, the media
rm with priority has less need to provide media diversity in order to attract
demand and therefore advertising revenues; on the other hand, the media
rm with no priority nds it more di¢ cult to use media diversity to attract
demand and advertising revenues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the base model. We then analyze the equilibrium of the net neutrality
case. Thereafter, we look at the equilibrium of the no net neutrality regime.
We conclude by discussing our main ndings.
2 The Model
The model considers one Internet Service Provider (ISP) and two Content
Providers (CPs), CP 1 and CP 2. The paper focuses on the CPs; the ISP
is exogenous to the model. We denote by P the price of network connection
charged by the ISP to end users. Under net neutrality, the ISP does not
charge CPs for sending information to end users. In turn, under no net
neutrality, the ISP can give priority (higher speed) to one CP for sending
information to end users. We denote by F the price of giving priority to one
4
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Figure 1: Fat Content
CP.
We adopt the Hotelling (1929) model, and as a result, each consumer
demands content from just one CP. We have that  is the content request
rate for each consumer (Poisson process);  is the network capacity; and 1

is the service time to deliver contents. The mass of consumers is normalized
to one and they have heterogeneous preferences in the Hotelling manner. In
other words, as in Hotelling (1929), consumers are uniformly distributed on
a line of length one, [0; 1]. The line represents consumerspreferences, which
are ordered in the usual fashion as in the Hotelling type of models from 0 to
1 (see gure 1).3 Similarly, the location of a media rm on the line indicates
the media rms location on the product variety spectrum. As in Hotelling
(1929), we consider a duopoly market structure, where the two media rms
are labeled as i = 1; 2. Where media rm 1 chooses location on the left side
of the line, and media rm 2 chooses location on the right side of the line.
The intensity of consumerspreferences, i.e.: transport costs in the Hotelling
model, are represented by t. Consumers patronize only one outlet, i.e.: con-
sumers have unit demands. In this way, x represents the consumer that is
indi¤erent between accessing CP 1 and CP 2. This means that the framework
adopted in this paper is an ideal variety model, given that consumers incur
a disutility cost when exposed to content that di¤ers from their preferred
variety.
With the exception of Garcia Pires (2013, 2014), a common assumption in
the media diversity literature is that media rms can only supply the media
market with one variety, i.e.: single-variety media rms. In this way, media
rms sell the same variety of content to di¤erent consumers. The current
paper di¤ers from this approach by allowing media rms to adapt content to
consumerspreferences. In particular, in our model, media rms can become
3Note that gure 1 does not necessary show the equilibrium of the game.
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multi-content media rms by covering di¤erent types of content.
To model multi-content media rms, i.e.: media rms that adapt content
to consumerspreferences, the model in this paper follows the approach by
Alexandrov (2008) to "fat products." With fat products, a rm o¤ers just one
product that contains a set of characteristics amongst which consumers can
choose at no extra cost. An example of a fat product is a software program
where consumers can choose between di¤erent applications. In other words,
fat products are dened as access products: when consumers pay to access a
given product, they can choose amongst what is o¤ered "inside" the product.
In the context of the media market, "fat content" refers to the case where a
media outlet caters to di¤erent preferences by providing di¤erent content for
instance on its website, and consumers can choose to consume from this set
of content o¤erings.4
The CPsmedia diversity scope, which equals the length of the Hotelling
line covered, is denoted by ki (with i = 1; 2). Media rms can decide to
adopt a single-content strategy or a multi-content strategy. A single-content
strategy corresponds to a single point on the line, while a multi-content
strategy corresponds to a line segment. In the multi-content strategy, the line
segment has a start point and an end point (in the single-content strategy
the start and the end points are the same). Consider that for media rm 1,
the start point of the multi-content strategy is x1 and the end point is d1.
Then d1 = x1+ k1 (see gure 1). In turn, for media rm 2, the start point of
the multi-content strategy is 1   x2 and the end point is 1   d2. Therefore
1   d2 = 1   (x2 + k2). In the single-content strategy (i.e.: k1 = k2 = 0) it
results that d1 = x1 and 1  d2 = 1  x2.
In the multi-content strategy the fat content segments of media rms 1
and 2 are [x1; x1 + k1 = d1]  x and [1  (x2 + k2) = 1  d2; 1  x2]  x.
The restrictions in relation to x, the consumer who is indi¤erent between
4Dewan et al. (2003) have a similar set-up to Alexandrov (2008). The di¤erence is
that Dewan et al. (2003) model product customization. Customization and fat products
are related but not identical concepts. With customization, a rm adapts a standard
product and transforms it into several customized products. A customized product can
be acquired at an additional price to that of the standard product. An example of a
customized product is a personal computer, where consumers can choose between di¤erent
components at di¤erent prices. Then, under customization, and contrary to fat products,
price discrimination is central. In the case of the internet media market, it seems more
appropriate to think in terms of fat products than customization, since for instance an
internet website is always just one product and price discrimination, in spite of some
attempts, is not the standard business practice in the industry.
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consuming content from outlets 1 and 2, are needed so that the fat segments
of the two media rms do not overlap.
In this way, consumer x then pays t (x  d1)2 to consume from CP 1
and t (1  x  d2)2 to consume from CP 2. The parameter t represents the
transport costs, which capture the degree of product di¤erentiation, i.e.: the
intensity of consumerspreferences.
We further denote u () = v as the consumersgross utility. Where v is
the reservation price. We assume that v is su¢ ciently large to ensue that the
market is covered.
CPs derive revenues only from advertising. The demand for ads for the
media rm i is:
ri =   ai, i = 1; 2, (1)
where ri is the price of advertising per consumer (revenue stream, click
through); ai is the advertising volume. In turn, the parameters  and 
represent the size of the advertising market.
Gross advertising income is then:
Ai = ((  ai) ai)Di, i = 1; 2, (2)
where Di is the demand for content from media rm i, with D1 = x
and D2 = 1   x; x is the consumer who is indi¤erent between consuming
content from CP 1 and CP 2. As we have seen above,  is the content request
rate for each consumer (Poisson process).
Prots for CP i, with i = 1; 2, can then be dened as:
i = Ai   Ci, i = 1; 2, (3)
where Ci is the cost of adapting content to consumerspreferences. Media
rms are prot-maximizing organizations and, as a result, the multi-content
decision depends on the costs and benets of this strategy. The costs, Ci,
include the search and adaptation costs associated with nding consumers
preferences and adapting content accordingly. In turn, the benets accrue
through higher demand, since consumers do not incur transportation costs
to consume content, i.e.: they consume their preferred variety of content.
Now assume that in order to adopt a multi-content strategy, media rms
have to incur adaptation costs, C. In particular, when a media rm follows
a multi-content strategy it must bear the additional xed costs of processing
7
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information related to the consumers tastes and of acquiring production
exibility to adapt content to these preferences. The xed costs follow a
positive relationship with the size of the multi-content segment, i.e.: the
higher the variety of content o¤ered, the higher the xed costs. For instance,
the media rm needs to hire more sta¤ as the content segment that it covers
increases. The idea is that, since consumers are uniformly distributed on the
line, the amount of data and exibility needed to adapt content to consumers
preferences increases with the size of the multi-content scope. The adaptation
costs C then equal:
Ci =
k2i
2
, i = 1; 2, (4)
where  represents the search and exibility costs pertaining to adapting
to consumerspreferences. In this sense, the costs associated with a multi-
content strategy increase with the width of the fat content segment o¤ered.
In addition, as in Alexandrov (2008), it is assumed that a media rms
location determines where on the line it can provide a multi-content strategy.
Accordingly, a media rms multi-content segment is contiguous on the line
(see gure 1). The reason for this might be that providing content further
way from the core of the media rms core business might increase costs
exponentially. For example, when a media rm o¤ers content very close to
its core business, it can reap economies of scope that reduce costs and increase
content quality. While if the media rm o¤ers content far away from its core
business, it needs to incur extra costs, like hiring extra sta¤ specialized in
the new segment. In addition, a content provider can alienate consumers
if it also provides content that is far away from the preferences of the core
group of loyal consumers. In both cases, we can think of for instance a CP of
sports related content and a CP of culture related content. Sta¤ specialized
in sports issues would not be qualied to cover culture issues, and consumers
that like culture could shy away from a culture CP that also distributes sports
content.
The timing of the game is the following. In stage 1, the CPs choose
location, xi, and the level of media diversity ki. In stage 2, the CPs decide
on advertising rates ai. In stage 3, users choose CP. We derive the equilibrium
of the model under the net neutrality and the no net neutrality regimes. The
main di¤erence is that under the no net neutrality regimes, one of the CPs
pays the ISP for priority at price F .
We follow the literature on net neutrality in assuming a M/M/1 queuing
8
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system. Under this system, the waiting time, w, under net neutrality equals:
w = 1
  , (5)
where  again is the gross content request rate, with  > . In this sense,
the M/M/1 queuing system has the property that w increases with , but
decreases with .
In turn, the waiting time with no net neutrality is somewhat di¤erent due
to the fact that one CP has priority (i.e. higher velocity). Assume, without
loss of generality, that CP 1 has priority. In this case, the waiting time is the
following:
w1 =
1
 1 , (6)
where 1 is now the total amount of tra¢ c from consumers who request
the content with the rst priority.
The waiting time for consumers who request content from the CP without
priority is:
w2 =

 w1 =

 
1
 1 . (7)
The M/M/1 queuing system then implies that for  > , w2 > w > w1.
In other words, the CP with no priority has longer waiting time. Further-
more, since @(w2 w1)
@
< 0, then quality access di¤erences between CPs become
smaller as capacity increases.
In this way, the utility of consumers under net neutrality equals5:
U1 = v   1    t (x^  d1)2   P
U2 = v   1    t (1  x^  d2)2   P . (8)
In turn, with no net neutrality, noting that 1 = ~x, we have:
U1 = v   1 ~x   t (~x  d1)2   P
U2 = v     1 ~x   t (1  ~x  d2)2   P . (9)
5For simplicity, we disregard nuisance costs of advertising. The introduction of nuisance
costs of advertising would not change the results qualitatively.
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Under net neutrality, the indi¤erent consumer, x^, is the one that equalizes:
v   1
     t (x^  d1)
2   P = v   1
     t (1  x^  d2)
2   P . (10)
Under no net neutrality, the indi¤erent consumer, ~x, is the one that
equalizes:
v   1
 ~x   t (~x  d1)2   P = v     1 ~x   t (1  ~x  d2)2   P . (11)
The prots of CP under net neutrality are just:
iN = Ai   Ci. (12)
Under no net neutrality, we have instead:
iNN = Ai   Ci   F; if rm buys priority
i = Ai   Ci; otherwise. (13)
3 Equilibrium of the Net Neutrality Game
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium of the net neutrality game. The
model is solved by backward induction. We rst have to nd the indi¤er-
ent consumer. Solving equation 10 for x^, we can show that the indi¤erent
consumer is the one that equalizes:
D1 =
(1 d2 d1)(1 d2+d1)
2(1 d1 d2) , with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j (14)
And D2 = 1   D1. We turn now to advertising rates. The rst order
conditions (FOCs) for advertising rates (ai) equal:
d1
da1
= 1
2
 (2a1   ) (d2   d1   1)
d2
da2
=  1
2
 (2a2   ) (d2   d1 + 1) (15)
Solving equation 15 for a1 and a2, we obtain:
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a1 = a2 =
1
2


(16)
In stage 1, media rms choose location and the level of media plurality.
We can show that the FOCs for di (with i = 1; 2) are:
d1
dd1
= 
2
8
> 0
d2
dd2
= 
2
8
> 0 (17)
The CPs then locate in the center of the line:
d1 = d1 =
1
2
. (18)
In terms of content competition, there is minimum di¤erentiation. How-
ever, if the end point of the fat content segment is d1 = d2 = 12 , this means
that both k1 6= 0 and k2 6= 0 are possible. To conrm this, it is necessary to
analyze the FOCs for ki (with i = 1; 2):
d1
dk1
= @1
@d1
   (k1)
d2
dk2
= @2
@d2
   (k2) . (19)
Solving for kL and kR, we obtain:
k1 = k2 =
1
8
2



> 0. (20)
Media rms thus choose to adapt content, kL = kR > 0.
The di¤erence of the game here relative to Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002)
is that in our paper media rms compete on advertising and media diversity,
while in Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002) media rms compete on advertising
and prices. Advertising competition, as shown in Gabszewicz et al. (2001,
2002), conduces to minimum di¤erentiation, since media rms want to at-
tract more demand in order to also attract more advertising revenues. Price
competition, on the contrary, conduces to maximum di¤erentiation, since
media rms want to relax price competition by locating far away from the
rival. Our model must be seen under this prism. If we introduce price com-
petition, we would also have an equilibrium with maximum di¤erentiation
(see Garcia Pires, 2014). For the purpose of the topic analyzed in this paper,
i.e. net neutrality, price competition is in our view not central, since very few
media rms compete on prices on the Internet; competition is more focused
on advertising and content.
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4 Equilibrium of the No Net Neutrality Game
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium of the no net neutrality game. We
follow the same strategy as in the net neutrality game. First, we nd the
indi¤erent consumer. To do this, we solve equation 11 for ~x to obtain:
D1 =
(2+(1 d2+d1)) 
r
(2 (1 d2+d1))2  82t( )(1 d1 d2)
4
. (21)
Again D2 = 1 D1. To nd the advertising rates, we solve the FOCs for
ai. We obtain the same advertising rates as in the net neutrality game, see
equation 16, i.e.: a1 = a2 = 12


.
In turn, the FOCs for d1 and d2 equal:
d1
dd1
=
2(4+t(1 d1 d2)2( )(2 (1 d2+d1)))
16(1 d1 d2)
q
t( )(1 d1 d2)(t( )(1 d1 d2)(2 (1 d2+d1))2 82)
+ 
2
16
d2
dd2
=
2(t(1 d1 d2)2( )(2 (1 d2+d1)) 4)
16(1 d1 d2)
q
t( )(1 d1 d2)(t( )(1 d1 d2)(2 (1 d2+d1))2 82)
+ 
2
16
(22)
And the FOCs for k1 and k2 are:
d1
dk1
= d1
dd1
   (k1)
d2
dk2
= d2
dd2
   (k2) (23)
We can now show that if  (network capacity) is much larger than  (gross
content request rate) then d1
dd1
> 0 and d2
dd2
> 0, i.e. minimum di¤erentiation.
In this case, we obtain the same equilibrium as in the net neutrality game:
d1 = d2 =
1
2
and k1 = k2 = 18
2



> 0.
On the contrary, if  (network capacity) is not much larger compared to
 (gross content request rate) then d1
dd1
< 0 and d2
dd2
< 0, i.e.: maximum
di¤erentiation. Then:
d1 = d2 = 0. (24)
Since the end point of the fat content segment is d1 = d2 = 0, this means
that also kL = kR = 0.
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We then have that the equilibrium of the no net neutrality game depends
on the relation between network capacity and network tra¢ c. If network
tra¢ c is too large relative to network capacity, in the no net neutrality regime
there will be lower media diversity than in the net neutrality regime. The
reason for this is that under the no net neutrality game, the CP with priority
is more protected from the rivals competition than in the net neutrality case.
This is especially true when network capacity is low in relation to network
tra¢ c, which penalizes the CP with no priority to a greater extent.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed the e¤ects of net neutrality on media diver-
sity. We have considered a model where media rms compete for advertising
revenues. This gives a two-sided nature to our model. On the one hand,
advertisers prefer media rms that have larger audience, since in this way
advertisers can communicate their message to more consumers. On the other
hand, media rms want to increase demand in order to attract more adver-
tisers.
In what concerns media diversity, we have allowed for media rms to
follow two strategies: media uniformity and media diversity. With media
uniformity, media rms only provide one type of content (a point in the
line, single-content strategy). With media diversity, media rms supply the
market with di¤erent types of content (a segment in the line, multi-content
strategy). The media diversity strategy is costly, since media rms have to
incur extra costs to provide media diversity. However, the advantage is that
it can lead to more demand, since consumers do not incur disutility costs to
consume content, as they can consume their preferred content variety.
We then have considered two regimes: the net neutrality regime and the
no net neutrality regime. In the net neutrality regime, CPs do not pay the
ISP to send content to consumers. In the no net neutrality regime, the ISP
gives priority to one CP in exchange for a payment.
In this set up, we show that under the net neutrality regime, CPs always
follow a media diversity strategy. Under the no net neutrality regime, the
equilibrium depends on the relation between network capacity and network
tra¢ c. If network capacity is large relative to network tra¢ c, the equilibrium
is similar to the one under the net neutrality regime, in that media rms
provide media plurality. If network capacity is small relatively to network
13
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tra¢ c, under the no net neutrality regime the media rms do not provide
media plurality.
The reason for media rms do not provide media diversity when network
capacity is small relative to network tra¢ c is that under the no net neutrality
regime, competition between media rms is weakened. In other words, in
the no net neutrality regime, the media rm with priority is protected from
competition from the rival. The reverse occurs for the rm with no priority,
which is more exposed to competition from the rival with priority. As a result,
while the media rm with priority has less need to provide media diversity
in order to attract demand and advertising revenues, the media rm with no
priority nds it more di¢ cult to use media diversity to attract demand and
therefore advertising revenues. As a result, both the media rm with priority
and the media rm with no priority have fewer incentives to provide media
diversity.
To sum up, our model indicates that one of the focuses that regulators
must have in mind with regard to the net neutrality debate is network ca-
pacity. In particular, regulators must ensure that network capacity is large
relatively to network tra¢ c.
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Media Diversity, Advertising and
Net Neutrality 
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In this paper we analyze the effects of net neutrality on media diversity. We show 
that in the net neutrality regime, media firms always provide media diversity, 
whereas in the no net neutrality regime, the equilibrium of the model depends on 
the relation between network capacity and network traffic. If the network capacity 
is large relative to network traffic, the equilibrium of the no net neutrality regime is 
similar to the one under the net neutrality regime. However, if network capacity is 
small relative to network traffic, under the no net neutrality regime media firms do 
not provide media diversity. The reason is that when network capacity is small rela-
tive to network traffic, the no net neutrality regime hinders competition. In other 
words, with no net neutrality, the media firm with priority sees its hinterland more 
protected from its rival than under net neutrality, and the contrary for the firm with 
no priority. As a result, while the media firm with priority has less need to provide 
media diversity to attract demand and, as such, advertising revenues, the media 
firm with no priority finds it more difficult to use media diversity to attract demand 
and advertising revenues.
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